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Abstract
Green’s study [Int. J. Forecasting (forthcoming)] on the accuracy of forecasting methods for conflicts does well against
traditional scientific criteria. Moreover, it is useful, as it examines actual problems by comparing forecasting methods as they
would be used in practice. Some biases exist in the design of the study and they favor game theory. As a result, the accuracy
gain of game theory over unaided judgment may be illusory, and the advantage of role playing over game theory is likely to
be greater than the 44% error reduction found by Green. The improved accuracy of role playing over game theory was
consistent across situations. For those cases that simulated interactions among people with conflicting roles, game theory was
no better than chance (28% correct), whereas role-playing was correct in 61% of the predictions. 2002 International
Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1 . Introduction predictive validity of game theory, and I was
unable to find any such studies.
In Armstrong (1997a), I reviewedCo-opeti- Many hundreds of academics have been
tion by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). working on game theory for half a century.
Their use of game theory to analyze real-world Thus, it seems strange that finding evidence on
situations seemed compelling. I concluded that its predictive validity is difficult. Imagine that
it was unfortunate that the decision makers had hundreds of medical researchers spent half a
not engaged the help of game theorists before century developing drugs without testing
they made their decisions. I had some misgiv- whether they worked as predicted. They would
ings about the book, however. For example, was not be allowed to market their drugs.
there any evidence that game theory had led to Kesten Green sent me an early draft of his
better decisions or predictions in conflicts? So I paper in July 2000 (Green, 2002). I thought it
contacted the authors. Brandenburger respondedwas an important contribution because he: (1)
that he was not aware of any studies of the described an important problem, (2) challenged
existing beliefs, (3) obtained surprising results,
(4) used simple methods, (5) provided fullE-mail address: armstrong@wharton.upenn.edu(J.S.
Armstrong). disclosure, and (6) explained it all clearly. In
0169-2070/02/$ – see front matter 2002 International Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PI I : S0169-2070( 02 )00024-9
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short, Green violated all the rules in the ‘Au- Predictions of decisions might also be of
thor’s Formula’ (Armstrong, 1982). That for- interest to parties outside a conflict. For exam-
mula, based on a review of empirical research, ple, in the case involving the negotiations
was updated in Armstrong (1997b). Given between the National Football League owners
Green’s violations of the formula, I expected and the Players Association, an insurance com-
that reviewers would reject the paper. To avoid pany offered the players strike insurance. To do
rejection, with the permission of Jan deGooijer, so, it had to forecast the likelihood that the
Editor of theInternational Journal of Forecast- players would decide to strike.
ing, I informed Green that his paper would be With respect to the best method to use, Green
accepted, subject to reasonable responses to any examined some of the more important methods
substantive reviewers’ concerns. that have been recommended for such situa-
Green had been systematic in his own evalua- tions. For example, game theory is often sug-
tion of his study. He rated the study on the 32 gested as a way to predict the behavior of
principles for the evaluation of forecasting rational decision makers, and we have ample
methods from Armstrong (2001c). His study did evidence from economics that predictions of
well on 28 of the principles, poorly on three, rational responses are often accurate, even when
with one judged as not relevant. I have reviewed surprising.
these ratings and am in agreement. The ratings The problem of predicting decisions in con-
are at kestencgreen.com/ratings.pdf. flict situations is important.
]]]]]]]]]I discuss whether: (1) the problem is im-
portant, (2) the findings are important, and (3)
3 . Important findings?the study was done in a competent manner. I
then provide suggestions for further research.
Green’s results show substantial differences
in accuracy among methods. On average, the
2 . Important problem? best method, role playing, had half the error rate
of the worst method, unaided judgment, in
Green’s problem can be stated in two parts: Is predicting actual decisions. In five of the six
it useful to accurately forecast the decisions situations, he found that role playing improved
made by parties in conflict? If so, which method accuracy over other methods. These findings
can best improve upon the way that people were obtained using over 1100 participants.
currently forecast such decisions? Seldom in studies of forecasting does one
With respect to the first question, it seems encounter such large improvements in accuracy.
that by better predicting the decisions of one’s For example, combining, which is regarded as
adversary in a conflict, one can make better one of the more important techniques in fore-
decisions. For example, in 1975, Britain refused casting, reduces error by about 12% (Arm-
to sell the Falkland Islands to a group of strong, 2001b). Green’s findings are important.
Argentine investors backed by the Argentine
government. As a result, it had to fight a war to
defend its ownership, which was clearly a less 4 . Competent science?
profitable alternative for Britain than selling the
islands. The three Argentine generals involved I examined Green’s use of the scientific
had not anticipated Britain’s response to method. Considering standard issues regarding
Argentinian troops occupying the Falkland Is- scientific methods and issues raised by review-
lands. They lost the war and their jobs. ers.
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4 .1. Was the design objective? 4 .4. Were the samples of participants
representative?
Green used the method of multiple hypoth-
eses. I believe this is an important procedure in Because Green’s experts assessed the be-
striving for objectivity. havior of others, there was no need to have
Green tried to avoid biases. Because of representative experts. Indeed, one would prefer
practical considerations, he could not always do the most capable, experienced, and interested
so. As it turned out, the design of his study experts. Thus, self-selection is beneficial.
favored game theory relative to unaided judg- (Studies of survey research have shown that
ment and role playing. people who are more interested in a topic are
more likely to respond; Armstrong & Overton,
1977). All of the game theory experts Green4 .2. Was the literature review complete and
used were self-selected, whereas the role-objective?
players and unaided judges were often captive
participants in classes. Self-selection wouldGreen used literature reviews published by
favor game theory here.others and references listed in key papers. These
Most of the unaided judges had little exper-procedures offer protection against the claim
tise. Since they had to draw in part upon theirthat he might have been biased in his search.
knowledge of similar situations, they wouldHowever, he also used theSocial Science
seem to be at a disadvantage relative to theCitation Index and Internet searches, which
self-selected game theorists.might lead to bias when screening the papers.
Finally, he sent e-mail messages to 474 game
theorists to determine whether relevant research4 .5. Was the sample of situations large
might have been overlooked. Given that re- enough?
searchers often advocate their own approaches,
consulting game theorists might have produced Green’s study was based on six situations.
findings favorable to game theory. Additional situations would improve one’s
confidence in the results. Still, using the Wil-
coxon signed-ranks test (one-tail), the probabili-4 .3. Were the samples of participants large
ty of getting such results would be only 0.03 ifenough?
game theory and role playing were equally
Some of the reviewers claimed that the study accurate methods.
was flawed because the sample of participants In Armstrong (2001a), I suggested that role
was too small. This criticism is unfounded playing was most appropriate when the interac-
because the participants based their predictions, tions in a conflict are examined. Because the
not on their own behavior, but on their knowl- Panabla did not involve interactions, I excluded
edge about the behavior of many people. As a it and recalculated the percentage of correct
result, expert opinion surveys need only five to responses. A striking picture emerged. Chance,
20 experts, depending on such things as the unaided judgment, and game theory produce
need for precision, level of expertise, and virtually identical results with about 28% cor-
variability of knowledge among the experts rect predictions, compared with 61% for role
(Ashton, 1986; Hogarth, 1978; Libby & Blash- playing.
field, 1978). Green obtained forecasts from 21 To assess the sensitivity of these results to the
experts in game theory. selection of situations, I then excluded each of
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Table 2the other five situations, one at a time. This
Were the situations biased against judgment?allowed for a comparison of the average accura-
cy with each combination of the remaining four Situations Correct by Correct by Percent
judgment role playing errorsituations. Again the results were consistent
aReduction(Table 1). The error reductions of role playing
over game theory were similar across these Artists’ reprieve 5 29 25
Distribution plan 5 75 74analyses.
55% plan 27 60 45Given these results, rather than using the
Zenith 29 59 42awkward term ‘‘role playing that simulates Panalba 34 76 64
interactions among people’’, we might use the Nurses 68 82 44
term ‘‘simulated interactions’’. a The error reduction was calculated as 1003 (unaided
judgments’ wrong predictions minus RP’s wrong deci-
4 .6. Was the sample of situations sions) /(unaided judgments’ wrong predictions).
representative?
One possibility is that when selecting situa- difficult situations. For example, the error re-
tions one is more likely to include ‘interesting’ duction was 48% for the three easiest and 50%
cases, and that one might have considered them for the three most difficult.
to be interesting because they were hard to
assess judgmentally. This would constitute a 4 .7. Did the participants follow the
bias against unaided judgment, thus favoring instructions?
game theory and role playing. To assess this
possibility, I examined the extent of the error Green studied a practical issue. Assume that
reductions of role playing relative to unaided you have a conflict situation. Would it help you
judgment and compared this to the extent to to ask leading game theorists to make predic-
which the correct answers were obvious to tions and to also ask that they make use of any
unaided judges. The results (Table 2) show no relevant expertise in game theory? In a real
evidence of bias with respect to easy versus situation, the extent to which game theorists
Table 1
Average percentage of correct forecasts with some situations excluded
Excluded Chance Unaided Game Role % Error
asituations judgment theory playing reduction
(GT) (RP) RP vs. GT
Panalba 28 27 28 61 46
Also excluding:
Artists 31 32 33 69 54
Distribution 27 32 27 58 42
55% 29 27 27 61 47
Zenith 27 26 29 62 46
Nurses 27 17 22 56 43
a Error reduction was calculated as 1003 (GT’s percent wrong predictions minus RP’s percent wrong decisions) /(GT’s
percent wrong predictions).
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were successful would depend not only on the evidence and found little support for the theory
value of game theory, but on whether they could that participants cooperate with experimenters.
successfully match the situation to their knowl- Rather, their concern seems to be to present
edge of game theory, and the extent to which themselves in a favorable light. Because the
game theory gave them a better understanding game theorists all identified themselves, this
of the situation. One would expect that those should have led them to have more of a concern
with more experience in game theory would be about looking good.
more skillful at applying game theory to these As with any study, bias might occur for other
situations. However, Green found that those reasons. Thus, it would be useful if someone
with more experience in game theory were no who believed that game theory might have some
more accurate in their predictions than novices. advantages over role playing would replicate or
He also found that those spending more time extend the studies.
were not more accurate.
The instructions for unaided judgment were
4 .9. Were there biases from variations ineasy to follow. However, the subjects using role
administration?playing had little experience with this approach.
Most were students, so it seems likely that some
One reviewer claimed that the design was
might not have taken the exercise seriously. As
faulty because there were variations in the
a result, game theory had an advantage over role
administrative procedures. For example, Green
playing in that the game theorists should have
allowed different times for different administra-
been able to follow the instructions.
tions of the forecasting methods. In my opinion,
Green provided minimal extrinsic incentives
variations are useful when a potential for bias
to the participants. Would the results have been
exists. Thus, for example, researchers are typi-
different had there been financial incentives?
cally advised to vary the order of the pre-
Remus, O’Connor, and Griggs (1998) examined
sentation of materials to participants (as Green
the evidence on this issue. Based on ten studies,
did).Variations also allow one to assess whether
they concluded that there is little evidence that
administrative procedures have any effect. On
financial incentives would improve accuracy for
the whole, I saw the variations as a benefit to
judgmental forecasting
Green’s design.
Intrinsic incentives would seem to favor the
game theorists because they were asked to use
game theory in making predictions. Presumably, 4 .10. Did Green provide full disclosure?
they would want to see game theory do well,
whereas the other participants had no attach- Green reported on all of his procedures,
ment to their methods. providing important details on the Internet. He
included information about the participants and
explanations of how they made their predic-4 .8. Was the administration biased?
tions. For a description of the reasoning the
The experiments were conducted by research- game theorists used, see kestencgreen.com/ap-
ers who had a prior hypothesis. Might this have proach.pdf.
produced an unintended bias that led particip- He was responsive to reviewers when they
ants to act as the researchers expected? Such asked for additional explanation. As nearly as I
effects are called ‘demand effects.’ Sigall, can judge, he has met the requirements for full
Aronson, and van Hoose (1970) examined the disclosure.
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4 .11. Would the use of other criteria affect periority of role playing hold up for a variety of
criteria.the conclusions?
Green’s study focused primarily on predictive
4 .12. Was the paper clearly written?validity. The use of a forecasting method also
depends on its cost, acceptability, assessment of
An important aspect of good research is thatrisk, and other factors. Green provides some
it be clearly written. Green’s paper has adetails on costs; game theory was the most
Flesch–Kinkaid readability index equal to 12thexpensive approach.
grade. It is much more readable than typicalIt would be useful to make empirical com-
scientific papers.parisons on the acceptability of unaided judg-
ment, game theory, and role-playing forecasts. It
seems reasonable to hypothesize that role play-
ing, by showing a vivid and detailed prediction 5 . Further research
of decisions, would be compelling to decision
makers. Green’s is the first study on the predictive
It is not clear how game theory would alert validity of game theory. While a single study is
decision makers to risk. In contrast, risk can be superior to having no studies, it cannot resolve
assessed through unaided judgment and role all of the issues. To date, the research effort
playing. Consider, for example our study of the devoted to game theory is probably thousands
journal royalties negotiation, which involved the of times that devoted to alternative procedures
International Institute of Forecasters and John for analyzing conflicts. My primary recom-
Wiley Publishers (Armstrong & Hutcherson, mendation is that game theorists should adopt
1989). Unaided judgment suggested that there the method of multiple hypotheses and embrace
was a 12% chance that the negotiations would procedures other than game theory.
lead to a cancellation of the contract, and role Does game theory add to an analyst’s way of
playing predicted a 42% chance of cancellation. making predictions in real situations? As noted
Cancellation would produce substantial losses to above, the procedures were biased in favor of
both parties. Thus, even though the prediction game theory. What if 474 non-game-theorist
was that there would be an agreement on adults with backgrounds similar to those of the
royalties, it would have been prudent to take game theorists were contacted, and the same
steps to avoid a cancellation. In fact, the actual situations were presented? Assume then that
outcome was a cancellation of the contract. those most interested made unaided judgmental
Game theory may have uses other than predictions. Would they be as accurate as the
forecasting, such as improving the search for game theorists? If so, one could conclude that
alternative solutions, although I expect that the superiority of the game theorists in Green’s
formal idea-generation procedures, such as study was due to their experience rather than to
brainstorming, would prove superior to game their knowledge of game theory.
theory for that purpose. Can game theory sub- Conflicts vary, so it would be useful to study
stantially improve the way managers think the conditions under which each approach is
about problems compared to, say, calculating most effective. To do this, one could examine
net present values for alternatives? more situations, especially if they differed sub-
In general, then, Green’s results on the su- stantially from those in Green’s study. Note, for
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example, that game theory was better than role series of interactions among the parties in
playing for the one situation that did not simu- conflict. Role playing was substantially more
late the interactions between groups. Goodwin accurate than game theory despite biases favor-
(2002) discusses various types of situations. It ing game theory.
would be useful to study real situations that In general, an examination of the procedures
were suggested by game theorists. To date, used in Green’s comparative study of forecast-
however, my appeals to game theorists to ing methods supports his findings. That said,
supply such situations have gone unanswered. much can be learned from further study of these
Experts who have experience with conflict issues. Hopefully, game theory researchers (and
situations might be able to make good forecasts others) will conduct empirical studies that
at a lower cost than role playing. They would be would assess the value of game theory relative
especially likely to do so if they identify to other approaches. More important, despite the
analogous situations in a structured manner. substantial benefits identified in research to date,
Research on analogies might help one to de- little research has been done on the use of role
termine whether it is possible to identify rel- playing as a forecasting technique. In particular,
evant experts, how one should structure the research is needed for simulated interactions in
forecasting task, and whether analogies could cases involving conflicts. We know little about
lead to low-cost predictions that were as accur- how to best implement role playing and about
ate as those by made by role playing. the conditions under which it is most effective
In his study, Green focused on forecasting. relative to other methods.
One might extend the study to decision making.
For example, has game theory led to better
decisions than those that could be obtained by R eferences
other methods, such as evaluating the net pres-
ent value of alternative strategies? Can using Armstrong, J. S. (1982). Barriers to scientific contribu-
game theory produce a better set of strategies tions: the author’s formula.Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 5, 197–199.than using brainstorming or other creative tech-
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Science and Engineering Ethics, 3, 63–84.
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